Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities represent critical security threats that attackers can exploit to achieve complete system compromise. The recent active exploitation of CVE-2025-11371 in Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox demonstrates how sophisticated threat actors transform seemingly minor LFI flaws into devastating remote code execution attacks.

CVE-2025-11371 affects all versions of Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox, including the latest release 16.7.10368.56560, with no available patch at the time of discovery. This unauthenticated Local File Inclusion vulnerability enables attackers to access any file on the system remotely without authentication.
The vulnerability exists in the default installation and configuration of both products, making thousands of organizations worldwide potentially vulnerable. Huntress Security researchers first detected active exploitation on September 27, 2025, when their SOC received alerts for successful CentreStack compromise affecting three customers.
The CVE-2025-11371 exploit demonstrates a sophisticated multi-stage attack that chains multiple vulnerabilities together. The attack begins with the LFI vulnerability allowing attackers to retrieve the machine key from the application's Web.config file without authentication. This machine key becomes the critical component that enables the second stage of the attack.
Attackers then leverage this extracted key to exploit the previously patched ViewState deserialization vulnerability CVE-2025-30406. By forging ASP.NET ViewState payloads that pass integrity checks using the stolen machine key, attackers bypass the earlier security fixes. The final stage achieves remote code execution through unsafe server-side deserialization of the forged ViewState payload.
This attack chain reveals how multiple vulnerabilities can be combined, where a seemingly lower-severity LFI enables exploitation of a previously mitigated critical RCE flaw. The sophistication demonstrates that attackers had identified a new attack vector to achieve the same devastating results even after the original vulnerability was patched.
Beyond the Gladinet case, attackers employ several established techniques to escalate LFI vulnerabilities into remote code execution. Log file poisoning represents one of the most common methods, where attackers inject malicious code into server log files through crafted HTTP requests containing PHP code in User-Agent headers. When the LFI vulnerability includes the poisoned log file, the embedded code executes as part of the server-side script.
File upload exploitation combines vulnerable upload functionality with LFI to achieve code execution. Attackers upload files containing malicious code, often disguised as legitimate file types, then use LFI to include the uploaded malicious file. Session file manipulation exploits PHP's session handling by poisoning session data with executable code, then using LFI to include the session file from the temporary directory.
Modern attacks also leverage environment variable injection targeting /proc/self/environ on Linux systems, template injection through server-side template engines, and PHP wrapper attacks using streams like php://input and data:// to inject code directly through LFI parameters.
LFI-to-RCE vulnerabilities create severe business risks extending far beyond technical compromise. Enterprise file-sharing platforms like CentreStack and Triofox handle sensitive organizational data, making successful exploitation particularly damaging. Organizations face potential data breaches, intellectual property theft, and complete system takeover.
The financial impact includes incident response costs, regulatory fines, business disruption, and reputation damage. Regulatory compliance implications affect organizations subject to data protection regulations like GDPR, HIPAA, or industry-specific standards. The interconnected nature of modern business systems means compromise of file-sharing platforms can provide access to connected databases, applications, and network resources.
Detecting LFI-to-RCE attacks requires comprehensive monitoring covering multiple attack stages. The Huntress detection of CVE-2025-11371 exploitation demonstrates the importance of behavioral analysis over signature-based detection. Their SOC identified suspicious base64 payloads executing as child processes of web server applications, indicating successful exploitation.
Organizations should monitor for common LFI patterns including directory traversal sequences, PHP wrapper usage, and requests for sensitive system files. Behavioral analysis becomes crucial for identifying unusual file access patterns, unexpected code execution, and anomalous process creation. Log analysis should focus on injection attempts in User-Agent headers, unusual requests to configuration directories, and access patterns suggesting reconnaissance activity.
File integrity monitoring provides another detection layer by alerting on unauthorized modifications to configuration files, web shell creation, and changes to critical system files. Network monitoring can detect outbound connections from web servers that indicate successful compromise and command-and-control communication.
The immediate mitigation for CVE-2025-11371 involves disabling the vulnerable temp handler in the Web.config file for UploadDownloadProxy. This targeted configuration change eliminates the specific attack vector while maintaining core functionality, demonstrating how strategic configuration hardening can address critical vulnerabilities.
Organizations should implement strict input validation with whitelists defining allowable file paths and rejecting dangerous characters like "../" sequences. Application-level controls should restrict file inclusion to predetermined directories and file types, using absolute paths to prevent directory traversal attacks.
System-level protections include implementing proper file permissions preventing web applications from accessing sensitive system files. Disabling dangerous PHP functions like system(), exec(), and shell_exec() in web-facing applications reduces the impact of successful code injection. Container security and application sandboxing provide additional isolation layers limiting the blast radius of successful exploits.
The sophisticated nature of CVE-2025-11371 demonstrates why organizations need expert security assessments to identify complex vulnerabilities. The attack required understanding ASP.NET ViewState mechanisms, machine key cryptography, and deserialization techniques. Automated vulnerability scanners often miss the nuanced interactions between multiple flaws that enable complete compromise.
Manual penetration testing provides the expertise necessary to identify complex attack chains combining multiple vulnerabilities. Security professionals can evaluate business logic flaws, test configuration weaknesses, and assess real-world exploitability of discovered vulnerabilities. This expert-driven approach becomes essential as attackers develop increasingly sophisticated techniques exploiting the interconnected nature of modern applications.
Monitor for suspicious file access patterns, unusual web server child processes, and unexpected outbound network connections. Look for base64-encoded payloads executing as child processes, requests for configuration files like Web.config, and access to system directories that applications shouldn't normally access.
LFI-to-RCE attacks achieve complete system compromise through seemingly minor vulnerabilities, often bypassing traditional security controls by leveraging legitimate application functionality. The ability to chain multiple vulnerabilities allows exploitation of previously patched systems through new attack vectors.
Capture The Bug is New Zealand's home-grown PTaaS platform, combining CREST-certified expertise with continuous vulnerability management. Built for modern engineering teams, it delivers live dashboards, instant retests, and measurable assurance - replacing static reports with real-time visibility.
🔗 Learn more: capturethebug.xyz
Flexible, scalable PTaaS for modern product teams.